In an earlier work entitled State Reorganization in South Carolina: Theories, Practices, and Further Implications (Young, 2002), the topic of restructuring state government was given relatively thorough coverage, particularly as it related to the comprehensive 1991 study commission (the South Carolina Commission on Government Restructuring) and the consequent 1993 restructuring act (Act # 181 of 1993). Additionally, and beyond speaking only to the South Carolina experience, one section of the book dealt expressly with the criteria normally associated with “successful” reorganization among the states.1 In this article, and related to this notion of criteria for successful reorganization, the author will focus more generally on implementation issues as they apply to state reorganizations.

To begin, the subject areas pertaining to reorganization are important ones.2 As the literature indicates quite clearly, restructuring theory—at least in the abstract—is logical, orderly, and primarily systemic. Implementation issues related to restructuring, however, are entirely another matter. This is mainly because implementation is often extraordinarily complex or, in other cases, poorly executed. Why indeed is this so?

Many reasons present themselves, and several stand out, especially those related to “poor execution.” One such reason for poor implementation is the lack of attention given to “tactical” planning measures. Once legislation has passed authorizing a state reorganization, the details of the consolidation (involving resources, infrastructure, and the like) have typically not been thought out or given serious consideration. This is obviously problematic. Another reason extends often to insufficient “preparatory steps” taken by the governor. Governors often are not prepared to implement reorganization legislation due to scarce monies or funding, marginal planning, or lack of directional expertise. Still another reason for poor implementation is sometimes the scarcity of so-called “promotional steps” undertaken to endorse and advance a reorganization plan. According to the literature, continuous and well-planned or executed “marketing” strategies and publicity are imperative to the success of reorganization.3

In the following discussion, several significant components of state restructuring implementation, stratagems or strategies if one prefers, will be touched upon. These include: 1) the question of timing, i.e., “Is this the most beneficial or gainful opportunity or time to execute a reorganization effort?” 2) the issue of tactics, i.e., “Should restructuring be done massively or on a large scale, that is all at once, or rather, is it more appropriate to proceed more slowly or incrementally?” 3) the question of adoption mechanism, i.e., “Does the restructuring effort require a constitutional and statutory change, or a statutory change alone, or can restructuring be effected by executive order?” 4) the role of the governor, i.e., “Does the governor’s role affect the enactment or passage of reorganization legislation?” and finally, 5) the issue of promotional campaign, i.e., “What methods or forums should be utilized to promote and lobby for state restructuring?”

Timing
The literature identifies two separate and distinct timing issues. The first is called the “cycle-oriented timing.” The other is referred to as the “circumstance-oriented timing.” The cycle-oriented timing will be discussed initially.

The cycle-oriented timing typology is a familiar and oft used one. This involves the recurrent time periods generally associated with, for example, the legislative session or the governor’s term of office. Of course, since the governor is usually the initiator of reorganization, it is logical to place emphasis here. The most fundamental question is: At what point is it most advantageous to initiate a restructuring effort? From here several questions present themselves. Is it most advantageous to start the restructuring theme or issue during the campaign for the governorship itself? Should it begin or intensify early into the new administration? Or on the other hand, is it better to proceed slowly and undertake restructuring and its consequent implementation well into the gubernatorial term? The answers to these questions, according to expert opinion, are all-important.

Some experts advocate that jump-starting the restructuring effort as soon as possible is the best strategy. Why? Quite simply a quick restructuring initiative will cause little or no loss of “political credits” that accrue during a campaign or early in an administration. Also, the proverbial “honeymoon” of a new chief executive is normally intact and legislators, interest groups, and others are likely to be more receptive to state reorganization at this time. Experts also assert that there is a natural tendency to maintain the status quo—in all respects, for instance, in terms of structure, process, and procedures. Experts of this school of thought believe that these tendencies to preserve the status quo are additionally cumulative in effect; therefore, the longer the governor takes to put his restructuring ideas into concrete actions, the greater the likelihood of significant opposition (Garnett, 1980, p. 52).

In this regard, it is further logical to assume that an early start of state restructuring will allow for plenty of lead-time. This would include the examination of alternatives, the drafting of legislation, and perhaps most importantly, the enlistment of political support among competing factions.

One problem that stands out here has to do with qualified personnel, especially at the beginning of a new administration. It is reasonable to assume that a governor cannot wait until restructuring has fully materialized to bring in talented personnel that have specialized proficiencies, for example, in criminal justice, health and human services, transportation, law enforcement, etc. What is suggested is that, if possible, the governor tap specialist or professional personnel in the “pre-reorganization” stages so that policy-driven structural changes and processes can be addressed and support for the overall restructuring effort can be enhanced to the greatest extent possible. This strategy is optimal, so say many experts, because it gives the governor immediate access to the specialized knowledge needed in a particular functional area. Further, this will empower the governor not only to make his case for consolidations and so forth, but will strengthen his ability to carry out actual implementation measures or strategies with finesse.

On the contrary, or the other spectrum, some experts believe that reorganization and its implementation should proceed slowly or in what is commonly referred to as the taking of “well-calculated paces.” These experts reason that any or all restructuring plans take ample time, rather great or small, to be conceptualized and prepared for. They argue that it is more advantageous to put the restructuring effort together meticulously with plentiful documentation, and to spell out in exhaustive detail the steps that will be required for implementation purposes. Garnett (1980, p. 53) points out one such illustration of this “sage” advice that comes from the experience of the Governor Sam H. Jones administration and its promotion of the Louisiana reorganization act of 1940. Governor Jones was so enthralled at passing comprehensive reorganization legislation, at the earliest possible date, that he and his staff overlooked a number of important constitutionality issues involved. The result has been frequently been described as “disastrous” and is consistently held by one school of thought to be an example of a legal quagmire that can on occasion befall reorganization attempts.

As stated earlier, the “circumstance-oriented timing” is the other distinct time issue connected with reorganization strategies. As the name implies it is typically set apart from legislative sessions and gubernatorial terms of office. As circumstance-oriented, it is clearly associated with certain events, conditions, and the like that are of such magnitude or “dramatization” that a logical response is a reorganization plan. In this vein, restructuring holds itself out as the appropriate and necessary step to be taken “to fix” a problem or set of problems faced by the state. Such examples of circumstance-oriented timing would include troublesome problems like those sometimes associated with chronically poor customer service at an agency or a succession of significant across-the-board budget cuts when revenues fail to meet expectations.

Another perspective associated with circumstance-oriented timing is the actual or perceived “mood” of the public. Expert opinion here states that legislatures are more apt to support reorganization if they feel the public is favorable to the idea of consolidation and mergers—combinations of either state agencies and/or programs. This is especially true if the public feels that the result of restructuring will offer a better quality of services, save money (bring about efficiencies), and reduce in general what might be considered “governmental waste.” This is by and large considered a conservative strategy, and in today’s political climate, many legislators are eager to capitalize on this idea and approach to reorganization. Thus, legislators are more apt to take risks and at the same time satisfy the public’s or their constituencies’ desires.

Hence, circumstance-oriented timing occurs when conditions within the state are, for instance, generally in a downturn or when there exist a number of problematic situations that seem to warrant restructuring. This restructuring strategy is, of course, a contingent one. If circumstances are not present to call for a restructuring effort, or if they are simply unknown because of the lack of data or information, or if no real and present danger is apparent, arguments for reorganization are difficult to make.

Tactics
Tactics in restructuring take on one of two approaches. The “comprehensive tactic” is what experts refer to as the implementation of a reorganization plan that encompasses the entirety of state government. This is, as one might conjecture, a restructuring effort of the greatest magnitude which carries with it numerous complexities and requires widespread support. The other tactic is referred to as the “incremental or piecemeal” approach. It quite unsurprisingly is distinguished as implementing a state reorganization over an extended period of time.

Comprehensive reorganizations are often accomplished in a single piece of legislation. This has its advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that an omnibus bill will contain the total reorganization package and therefore is meritorious in the sense that the whole picture of state reorganization can be seen as each part or organizational component fits together. Another advantage is that one comprehensive piece of legislation stands a better chance, in some cases, to pass instead of several separate bills. While the reverse can be said to be true, nevertheless, typically greater attention is given to a comprehensive bill where legislators can feel inclusion through the amendment process. Additionally, a comprehensive restructuring bill can be attached to another bill that is surely to pass. The best example here, of course, is an appropriation bill.

Disadvantages to comprehensive restructuring legislation are mainly that some of the portions of the proposed legislation are so controversial or otherwise unacceptable to the legislature that the whole restructuring bill atrophies or dies. In other words, while the overall thrust of a reorganization plan or piece of legislation might be acceptable, one provision may be simply too onerous for legislators to accept. The “all-the-eggs-in-one-basket” is therefore not without some risk. Still, an amendment or compromise may be the remedy.

The incremental tactic is also believed by many experts as the way to go and, more often than not, represents a “more preferable” approach than that of the comprehensive tactic. Some experts argue that incremental tactics provide for trial and error and, as the case may be, adjustments. The incremental approach allows also for a series of possible “victories” and perhaps only an occasional “defeat.” This some argue gives the governor a chance to lose a battle or two, but still be triumphant in the long haul.

Former Georgia governor and then later president Jimmy Carter, however, preferred the comprehensive tactical approach. He sums up his preference in the following way:

The most difficult thing is to reorganize incrementally. If you do it in one little tiny phase at a time, then all those who see their influence threatened will combine their efforts in a sort of secretive way. They come out of the rat holes and they’ll concentrate on undoing what you’re trying to do. But if you can have a bold enough, comprehensive enough proposal to rally the interest and support of the general electorate, then you can overcome that special-interest type lobbying pressure. (quoted in Peirce, 1975, April, p. 506.)

Interestingly enough, President Carter’s initiatives at federal reorganization were quite the reverse of his own philosophical or ideological positions. In 1977, for example, the president made public that no “master plan” for federal reorganization would be put forth and that a series of incremental advances in restructuring would take place “using a bottom up approach.” President Carter’s success in implementing meaningful reorganization within the federal bureaucracy was mixed, but in the main, a failure by most accounts.

Adoption Mechanisms
This discussion pertains to the “adoption mechanisms” utilized to bring about reorganization. As with the other implementation strategies discussed, these adoption mechanisms also break down into two categories—those requiring constitutional changes and those requiring statutory ones.4 In the case of constitutional changes this is more involved since first a joint resolution must be approved by the legislature to allow for a referendum. If the referendum is passed by the electorate, then statutory legislation is needed to actually bring about the reorganization. If the referendum fails, statutory legislation pertaining to reorganization is then null or unneeded.

Constitutionally established offices are those that fall within the executive branch. They may, and often do, have statutory authorization and provisions as well. Constitutionally established offices are also statewide offices, chosen by the state’s voters, and extend into what would be typically the province associated with the duties and responsibilities of the state’s chief executive, viz., the governor. In most states, and varying by degree, multiple statewide elected offices (termed the “long ballot” or the “plural executive”) exist. On average, there are roughly 10 separately elected executive-level officials per state (Beyle, 1999, p. 209).

Generally speaking, these plural executives are fairly entrenched officers, having built up statewide constituencies and considerable political clout. Many have no term limits and effectively use their statewide elected position as a “stepladder” to higher office, especially that of governor. (Carter and Young, 2003, p. 32).

Currently, it is interesting to note that only four states have a governor and lieutenant governor–type arrangement whereby no other statewide elected officers exist and, consequently, vie for executive power. About half the state governors share some power with other separately elected official(s). (Carter and Young, 2003, p. 32).

Experts disagree considerably on the potentialities and possibilities of the removal of constitutionally established officers and their accompanying departments or offices—bureaucracies. Many experts argue that the likelihood of removing a statewide elected office is slim due to the fact that constituencies that benefit from a separate constitutional office are generally opposed to diminishing their real or perceived clout under the status quo. Contrarily, other experts assert that the public as a whole believes that a governor should be accountable for what is clearly an executive function and that a long ballot simply diffuses responsibilities.

Statutory authorization of a reorganization plan is perceived by experts as being a wholly different matter. First, the constitutional constraints and hindrances normally associated with statewide offices are clearly not factors. Second, reorganization by statute is focused on the issues at hand, typically more accountability, greater efficiencies, and more effective service delivery. Thirdly, consolidation of agencies or programs by statute can be done more easily as well when debate is done over (or spans) one legislative session as opposed to two (i.e., the second being the statutory follow-up required after a referendum). Oftentimes, once a referendum passes to allow for a constitutional change the debate can be precarious. This is of no small matter and it is particularly precarious when legislators want “to tinker” with the devolved duties and responsibilities that a governor gains with the elimination of a statewide constitutional officer.

In passing, it should be noted that a third kind of adoption mechanism is sometimes utilized. This kind of reorganization is done by executive order. Quite naturally, time and again, the legislature takes great umbrage to this mechanism. And, in most cases, the legislature cannot be ignored since most state governmental entities are established by law or enabling legislation.

Role of the Governor
Here, as stated earlier, is a rather matter of fact question. Does the governor’s role influence the enactment of restructuring legislation? And, perhaps more importantly, to what extent?

State governors are clearly in a position to affect restructuring legislation. But much is of course dependent on what a governor actually does or doesn’t do. Herein lies the significance of the governor’s role and its impact on favorable outcomes associated with reorganization legislation. State governors are in a position to advocate and push for re-organizational change through various strategies, such as those dealing with timing, tactics, and adoption mechanisms. The fundamental question here is: Is there evidence that aggressive gubernatorial intervention is likely to produce favorable results? The answer to this question, unfortunately, is that not much literature covers this important issue, yet enough anecdotal evidence is available that indicates that a governor’s determined involvement is instrumental to—in many cases—the success of restructuring when played out in a careful strategy of timing, tactical approaches, etc.

One important evidential finding made by experts about state restructuring efforts among the states is that the governor’s role in creating a kind of partnership with key legislators usually leads to greater success in restructuring. It is well known in public administration, leadership and motivational theories, that if individuals “are made part of the vision,” in this case restructuring, the likelihood of success multiplies. Most experts agree that it is additionally important for the governor to remain in frequent contact with legislative members to reinforce his commitment and stance as to reorganization and its benefits. Some experts point out that not only should the governor’s role extend to the legislative leadership and those that favor restructuring, but also to those legislators who are opposed to any change in the status quo. One failure of the governor, in some cases, is ignoring those who stand in opposition to restructuring. While the governor may feel he has the votes to pass his restructuring legislation, it is advocated that those with differing viewpoints get an opportunity to engage the governor in a “one-on-one.”

It is interesting to note that early and comprehensive reorganizations in the states of Illinois, Virginia, and New York were largely attributable to aggressive tactics undertaken by the governor. The activist governors, as the literature seems to indicate, campaigned vigorously for restructuring. The campaign themes were generalized, repetitive, and easily understood by all. These are familiar themes, including, greater accountability, more efficient use of resources, cost-savings by the reducing of duplication of effort, and better service to the citizenry.

Another significant role of governor appears to be a kind of aggressiveness in seeing that restructuring is on the “front burner” at all times. Campaigning for the governorship and actually becoming governor leads to a kind of dramatic switching of gears. No longer are the campaign issues ever-present, but a number of rather mundane duties and responsibilities compete for the attention and time of the governor once in office. Hence, restructuring—for example—could possibly be relegated to a more minor preoccupation for the governor. It is therefore important for the governor to set into permanence some mechanism or strategy that keeps the restructuring initiative on a high priority list. This is especially important when reelection approaches. It is at this time that the governor wants to demonstrate progress on his former campaign issues and promises, and argue for a continuation of that progress.
In this respect, the governor and his advisors are not only the center-point of a restructuring effort, they “are additionally the clearinghouse for information on all respects dealing with restructuring.” Legislators know that information on the particulars of restructuring, financial impacts, and other ramifications can be sought out in the office of the governor. The governor obviously should be prepared and willing to respond to legislative requests.

More pointedly, the role of the governor in restructuring is one of chief lobbyist. The governor and his staff bear the brunt of lobbying for restructuring, especially seeing to the passage of reorganization legislation. This lobbying takes on several forms, some of which have already been alluded to. One suggestion by experts is to publicize, via the media, the needs and benefits of reorganization, through a series of town meetings. This is an excellent opportunity for the governor to get his restructuring message out, reinforce it before the public, gain supportive media attention, and build coalitions where needed. In some cases, should the governor prefer it, he or she could invite legislative leadership, and private sector leadership to participate in some type of panel discussion or scenario.

Promotional Campaign
Promotional campaign strategy combines, in effect, the stratagems associated with timing, tactics, adoption mechanisms, and the role of the governor (Garnett, 1980, pp. 62-70). One initial thought or remark, however, is necessary at this juncture. The governor who puts forward a reorganization plan must be cognizant that alternative plans may be suggested and/or actually put into bill form. These alternatives may not be in alignment with the governor’s own plans. It is therefore important to be prepared to meet these challenges at the earliest opportunity. Hence, the burden of proof is on the governor to demonstrate that his or her plan is better than an opposing one. To do this, it advisable that the governor and his or her advisors be prepared early in the gubernatorial term for such matters.

The promotional campaign consists of two target groups: “influentials” and the general public. Influentials are legislators and special interest lobbyists. Also included in this category is the bureaucratic lobby—state agencies, departments, etc.—that urge and look out for their own interests. Lobbyists, both private and agency-sponsored, can be formidable foes to restructuring. Each lobbyist group must be given due consideration and a promotional strategy should be in place to meet any potential threat they may pose.

The promotional campaign for the general public should be kept simple in terms of the “message,” and continuous reiteration of the benefits and advantages of restructuring is all-important. Therefore, the governor and his aides—but especially the governor—should strive to keep the restructuring initiative and its benefits to them (the public) alive as often as possible.

Another important consideration regarding the promotional campaign is the “synchronization of research and promotion.” The literature generally suggests that the governor should not wait until the details of restructuring, while of immense importance, have been worked out before gathering and focusing support on his restructuring plan. Research is of significance but can be done incrementally or at a pace conducive to something well-thought out, complete, and rationally constructed. As regards research, it is advisable that those responsible in the governor’s office for implementation of the reorganization plan begin their work early mainly to achieve a smooth transition as regards consolidations and mergers. The fewer gaffes or mistakes in the actual implementation of restructuring will make the governor’s job as chief architect of the restructuring easier and more acceptable, particularly thwarting any opposition.

Conclusion
In this article, several topics related to the implementation of a restructuring plan were briefly discussed. State restructuring in-and-of-itself is a subject matter that the literature speaks to in great detail. Implementation issues or strategies are limited insofar as coverage by the literature and scholarly work. Nonetheless, this dearth of research on the topic of implementation does not convey, nor should it, its importance and magnitude.

The timing, tactics, roles of the governor, and promotional campaigns undertaken under the rubric of state reorganization speak for themselves. Namely, the success of restructuring is measured by the thought and consideration given to implementation issues and strategies (timing, tactics, etc.) as well as the restructuring plan itself. Thus, a clear determinate for reorganization is its implementation and those who acknowledge this fact derive significantly greater prospects for future change and improvements to state organizational units and processes.

Appendix
Criteria for State Governmental Reorganizations
Generally and foremost, state reorganizations should be planned and implemented in light of each state’s uniqueness. This includes consideration of a state’s individual historical and cultural heritages, its populace, its existing institutional structures, its social and economic structures, its political makeup, and even its geographical setting. While one can learn much from the literature and the experiences of other states, all of which is entirely valuable and edifying, still a state’s distinctive aspects must be also taken into any reorganization examination processes and consequent deliberations. To do otherwise and strictly emulate another state’s reorganization, spells inevitable failure, according to most experts.

Having said this, on the other hand, the literature on state reorganization suggests criteria or a checklist of considerations that one should be attentive to in order to plan and implement reorganizations. This literature is plentiful, though much of it is a little dated, and includes documentation from the experiences of other state reorganization efforts. The lessons learned from other states are most instructive and are, therefore, a utilitarian basis for states considering restructuring of any kind and to any extent. The discussion that follows outlines some important considerations for states that are considering reorganization.
What considerations should be taken into account, generally speaking, with regard to state restructuring processes? In other words, what do the literature and the experiences of other state reorganizations suggest in order to accomplish a successful restructuring effort? Based on a review of earlier reorganization studies, etc., 12 considerations or criteria present themselves. These are:

1. Identify the strategic aims or purposes of restructuring.
2. Distinguish clearly the problems that reorganization seeks to fix.
3. Consider all vital stakeholders to be affected by restructuring.
4. Encourage the participation of those directly affected by restructuring.
5. Inspire, by example, commitment of participants at all levels of participation in the reorganization process.
6. Combine restructuring processes and outcomes with management and administrative improvements.
7. Recognize that reorganization is an ongoing or continuous process.
8. Prepare for an investment of resources to accomplish reorganization.
9. Point out and empower those responsible for restructuring.
10. Be cognizant of the constraints to achieving restructuring.
11. Grasp the political and organizational cultures of those affected by reorganization.
12. Establish a schedule for implementation and evaluation of restructuring. (State Reorganization Commission, 1991, pp. 40-42).

Reorganizations, as stated in the literature, often fall short of successful results because of the lack of strategic planning. Reorganization is a complicated, lengthy, and ongoing process that must take into consideration intended long-range goals, a review of environmental conditions (internal and external) of the organization’s strengths and weaknesses and any justifiable institutional opportunities and threats. Specific objectives and operative plans should additionally be considered. An evaluation of performance and implementation resulting from reorganization should then be well thought-out. Hence, strategic planning, for reorganization purposes, should normally include the following steps:

• An “environmental scan” or a situational analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, including an analysis of external threats and opportunities;
• The formation of or the “putting into words” of a vision for the future and an accompanying mission statement that defines the fundamental purpose of an organization, its values, and its boundaries;
• The development of general goals, specific targets or objectives, and performance measurements to gauge organizational progress;
• A set of strategies to indicate what will be done to accomplish its goals and objectives;
• The implementation of detailed operational or tactical plans that provide for staff assignments and schedules; and finally,
• An evaluation component to monitor and revise the overall strategic approach as it unfolds. (Young, 1998, pp. 3-4).

In conjunction with strategic planning, a problem assessment should be conducted. This will allow those responsible for any restructuring efforts to distinguish clearly and comprehend the problems that are caused by current organizational structures and their related processes. Questions should be entertained that are important and fundamental to understanding or getting to the “root causes” of organizational troubles. Why, for instance, is the organization failing to fulfill adequately its mission, its goals, and/or its stated objectives? Are the problems indeed endemic to present structural arrangements? If so, then why? Are there management or administrative problems and, if so, will restructuring serve to help rectify these problems or will it do little or perhaps even exacerbate them? How long have these problems existed and what effect(s) have they had on agency constituencies, employees, and other stakeholders?

As for stakeholders, another critical criterion presents itself. In question form, “Who are the stakeholders ultimately and who will lose and who will gain from any reorganization?” Often stakeholders are identified in a nebulous way and reorganization, in and by itself, will nevertheless greatly impact them. In restructuring, it is always wise to identify everyone that will be affected by the reshuffling of an organization. If the area marked for restructuring is public education, for example, “How will students be affected? Parents? Teachers? And so on?”

Also, closely related to the question of stakeholders, the literature on reorganization typically refers to “the encouragement of all participants” in a restructuring effort. This means simply that state employees, clientele groups, legislators, and other appropriate government officials should have input into the reorganization plan. This is cited as being beneficial in several ways. First, if everyone is encouraged to participate then, all concerns, views and ideas are on the table early on in the restructuring process and can serve as part of the analysis leading to a workable reorganization. Secondly, the concerns and views of a wide group of involved individuals will yield inevitably a better and more thoroughly constructed restructuring plan. This will in turn allow for fewer foul-ups, mishaps, and gaps in the implementation of a reconstituted organization. Finally, the encouragement of all participants allows for the opportunity of “early buy-in” by affected groups and the chance to address, and in many cases, reconcile their varying concerns and viewpoints. (State Reorganization Commission, 1991, p. 41).

Furthermore, an essential criterion is “the preparation to invest in the costs for carrying out reorganization” (State Reorganization Commission, 1991, p. 42). Those individuals involved in reorganization planning should be aware that restructuring invariably costs money. The planning effort alone is an expenditure item. Other costs range widely. They may and often do include costs associated with new technologies and control systems, staff training and development, and retrofitting or establishing new facilities. The cost-savings expected from reorganization by eliminating duplication of effort, merging programs, downsizing staff, and the minimizing of “waste” may or may not result in a net gain in terms of cost-savings. According to a report of the former S.C. State Reorganization Commission:

Reorganization will certainly require the expenditure of funds… No one knows what the cost will be, but proponents should not undertake reorganization in order to realize immediate reductions in the outlays for governmental services. The evidence thus far is not optimistic about the opportunity to achieve such cost savings. There are other sound reasons for undertaking a reorganization effort, and the merits of a proposed reorganization should be seriously considered on the basis of other more practical and obtainable objectives. (State Reorganization Commission, 1991, p. 42).

Who is responsible for what? This is another key question (criterion) to be considered in attaining a smooth and successful restructuring. Early in the planning stages of reorganization, and up to and including the implementation phases, responsibilities for restructuring should be plainly identified. Reorganization of state governmental agencies is a monumental task and highly complicated and all restructuring players should be apprised what the plan is and what part they have in that plan and its implementation. Task assignments should be, when possible, in the form of written memoranda and milestones and timelines should be clearly sketched out and communicated to responsible parties and individuals. Interaction among all participants in the implementation phase of reorganization should be at regular intervals and sustained, and alternate plans should be in place should problems arise.

Two final criteria should also be considered carefully when, or perhaps before, reorganization begins. First, all participants should recognize there are “customary” and predictable constraints and limitations in governmental reorganization undertakings. These are characterized typically as conceptual, political, fiscal, and human constraints. Reorganizing state government, for instance, has its conceptual limitations in the various and opposing views, approaches, and experiences of participants. Some individuals are often predisposed to be cynical about any reform or change to the status quo. Political aims and concerns are also usually real and present in restructuring. Secondly, everyone connected with a state reorganization effort should understand that it is an on-going process and is never complete. All organizations are in a constant state of some form of change. Internal and external pressures are always exerting themselves in some way on organizational units and programs. Thus, organizing and reorganizing to make suitable adjustments to these environmental influences is a reality that must be considered and dealt with in an appropriate manner. Experts in the field of reorganization note that agency clientele needs and preferences are rarely stagnant for long. Also, technological changes are occurring at lightning speed. And agency resources, particularly employees, are constantly shifting in terms of turnover, workload, specialties, training needs, and so forth.

Endnotes
1 This discussion is reprinted for consideration in an appendix to this article.
2 See Garnett, J. L. (1980). Reorganizing state government: The executive branch. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
3 See Garnett, J. L. (1980). Reorganizing state government: The executive branch. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
4 Although these two categories (constitutional and statutory) are primary, and are the most frequently used adoption mechanisms, a third ancillary category infrequently used will also be briefly discussed later in this section.

References
Beyle, T. L. (1999). State and local government: 1999-2000. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Carter, L. F., and Young, R. D. (2003). The South Carolina governor: The emergence of an institution. Columbia, SC: Institute for Public Service and Policy Research, University of South Carolina.
Garnett, J. L. (1980). Reorganizing state government: The executive branch. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Peirce, N. R. (April 1975). “Structural reform of bureaucracy grows rapidly.” National Journal 7: 502-8.
South Carolina State Reorganization Commission. (April 1991). On reorganization: An overview of theory, practice and the South Carolina experience. Columbia, SC: South Carolina State Reorganization Commission.
Young, R. D. (2002). State reorganization in South Carolina: Theories, practices, and further implications. Columbia, SC: Institute for Public Service and Policy Research.
Young, R. D. (1998). Statewide strategic planning process: The need for the state’s leadership of South Carolina to plan ahead. Columbia, SC: Institute for Public Service and Policy Research, University of South Carolina.

About the Author
Richard D. Young is director of governmental research with the Institute for Public Service and Policy Research at the University of South Carolina. He conducts research on a myriad of public policy and public administration topics relating to state and local governments. Mr. Young previously worked with the Senate of South Carolina and the State Reorganization Commission in various positions of research. Prior to this, Mr. Young taught at the University of Louisville, Hanover College, Indiana University Southeast, and the University of Kentucky Campus in Louisville, Kentucky. Mr. Young has a B.A. (1973) and M.A. (1975) from the University of Louisville. The Institute for Public Service and Policy Research has published Mr. Young’s A Brief Guide to State Government in South Carolina (1999) and A Guide to the General Assembly of South Carolina (2000). The Institute has also published Mr. Young’s book entitled Perspectives on Public Budgeting: Budgets, Reforms, Performance-based Systems, Politics and Selected State Experiences (2001). He and Dr. Luther Carter have recently written a book entitled, The South Carolina Governor: The Emergence of an Institution. Mr. Young can be reached at young-richard@sc.edu.